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PRODUCTS LIABILITY-STRICT LIABILITY IN TORTS
The New Mexico Rejection of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts §402A.-Sfang v. Hertz Corp.,
83 N.M.-. 490 P.2d 475 (N.M. Ct. App. 1971),
cert. granted Oct. 20, 1971
Catherine Lavan, a nun, was a passenger in an automobile rented
by another nun from Hertz Corporation, when a blowout occurred.
In the ensuing accident Catherine Lavan suffered injuries resulting in
her death. The tire which blew out was manufactured by Firestone
Tire and Rubber Corporation and was mounted on an automobile
owned by Hertz. Catherine Lavan's personal representative brought
an action against the tire manufacturer, Firestone, and the lessor of
the automobile, Hertz. The case against Firestone was tried and sub-
mitted to a jury. The verdict was in favor of Firestone, and no appeal
was taken from that verdict. The trial court directed a verdict in
favor of Hertz. The plaintiff appealed this verdict and contended
there were issues for the jury concerning express warranty and strict
liability in tort. The evidence concerning the latter contention was
that the "tire failure was the cause of the accident; this failure re-
sulted from impact damage to the car; the impact damage existed at
the time the car was rented; and the impact damage was not dis-
coverable by normal inspection procedures."' Held: there was in-
sufficient evidence for the question of express warranty to be sub-
mitted to the jury. An extention of a seller's liability from liability
for negligence to strict liability under Section 402A of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts lies with the legislature and not the court.
Such an extension involved unknown accident statistics, economic
consequences, and public demands which the court felt unable to
ascertain.
The decision rejecting strict tort liability was unexpected. The
trend of recent court decisions has been toward the imposition of
strict tort liability on manufacturers and dealers for product defects
which cause injuries to consumers or third parties. In early 1971, the
status of the law in all United States jurisdictions as most recently
determined by the highest court of the particular jurisdiction was
that strict tort liability was imposed in twenty-two states and the
admiralty jurisdiction.2 In addition, the Indiana Appellate Court and
1. Stang v. Hertz Corp., 83 N.M.-, 490 P.2d 475 (N.M. Ct. App. 1971), cert. granted
Oct. 20, 1971.
2. This list is compiled from 1 CCH Prod. Liab. § 4070 (1968); Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d
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federal courts interpreting the laws of Colorado, Louisiana, Rhode
Island, and Vermont have anticipated adoption of strict tort liability
in those states.' Michigan and New York have inferentially adopted
the doctrine.4
The imposition of strict tort liability has been a step-by-step
process usually achieved by the judiciary, beginning with the creation
of exceptions to the privity rule which protected manufacturers and
dealers from liability,' and culminating in extension to the strict tort
liability rule.6 This gradual growth has generally followed this pat-
1057, 1071-72 (1967); and 13 A.L.R.3d 1057 (Supp. 1971). The 22 states are Alaska,
Arizona, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin.
3. Id. In Moomey v. Massey Ferguson, Inc., 429 F.2d 1184 (10th Cir. 1970), the court
anticipated the adoption of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965) (strict tort
liability) in New Mexico.
4. Id.
5. From the 1842 case of Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 10 M. & W. 109
(Ex. 1842), there developed a general rule of non-liability to consumers or users of products
where the consumer or user was not in contractual privity with the manufacturer. Possibly
because manufacturing was in its infancy, there was a strong desire on the part of the courts
to have definite limits on the liability of manufacturers to third persons. Lord Abinger, C.
B., stated in Winterbottom what was to become the general rule requiring privity of contract
between the consumer and manufacturer before the consumer might recover damages for an
injury caused by a latent or hidden defect in the manufacturer's product:
I am clearly of opinion that the defendant is entitled to our judgment. We
ought not to permit a doubt to rest upon this subject, for our doing so might
be the means of letting in upon us an infinity of actions.... Here the action is
brought simply because the defendant was a contractor with a third person;
and it is contended that thereupon he became liable to everybody who might
use the carriage.... There is no privity of contract between these parties; and
if the plaintiff can sue, every passenger, or even any person passing along the
road, who was injured by the upsetting of the coach, might bring a similar
action. Unless we confine the operation of such contracts as this to the parties
who entered into them, the most absurd and outrageous consequences, to
which I can see no limit, would ensue....
10 M. & W. at 112-13.
6. The first court to hold a manufacturer strictly liable in tort was the California
Supreme Court in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 67, 377 P.2d 897, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). The concept of strict liability in tort was adopted by the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965):
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably danger-
ous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his
property if
(a) The seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) It is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without sub-
stantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although
(a) The seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
his product, and
(b) The user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
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tern: (1) elimination of the privity requirement with respect to food
and beverages sold for human consumption;7 (2) abolition of the
requirement of privity when dealing with inherently' and im-
minently9 dangerous products; (3) total abandonment of the privity
requirement in a tort action against a manufacturer or supplier;' 0 (4)
extension of warranty liability to cover the sale of any product with-
out regard to privity, sale or notice of a breach of warranty;' ' and
(5) judicial acceptance of the strict tort liability doctrine.' 2
7. See, e.g., Tomlinson v. Armour & Co., 75 N.J.L. 748, 70 A. 314 (1908).
8. See, e.g.; Thomas V. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852). In Thomas a drug manufacturer
had falsely labeled a bottle which contained belladonna, a deadly poison, as extract of
dandelion, a harmless medicine. Winchester, the manufacturer, had sold the incorrectly
labelled drug. to a druggist in New York City, who later sold it to a druggist in Cazenovia,
New York. Upon a doctor's instruction, Thomas bought what he belived was the extract of
dandelion from the Cazenovia druggist and administered it to his wife, who became ill.
Thomas sued the drug company for damages and the court allowed him to recover though
he was not privy in contract with the manufacturer. As to "inherently dangerous products,"
a distinction was recognized between an act of negligence dangerous to the lives of others
and one that was not. Sales of drugs (described as "inherently dangerous products") were
excepted from the privity rule, and liability was imposed in this case on the manufacturer
upon general principles of negligence.
9. See, e.g., Devlin v. Smith, 89 N.Y. 470, 42 Am. R. 311 (1882) and cases cited in
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
10. The complete rejection of the privity requirement began with the most famous case
of product liability law, MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050
(1916). See also Smith.v. Atco Co., 6 Wis.2d 371, 94 N.W.2d 697 (1959); Carter v. Yardley,
391 Mass. 92, 64 N.E.2d 693 (1946). In Carter the court stated:
The MacPherson case caused the exception to swallow the asserted general rule
of nonliability, leaving nothing upon which that rule could operate....
The time has come for us to recognize that the asserted general rule [requir-
ing privity] no longer exists. In principle it was unsound. It tended to produce
unjust results. 64 N.E.2d at 700.
11. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motor Co., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960),
which held that an implied warranty of reasonable suitability for use accompanies a product
into the hands of the ultimate purchaser. This case is the basis for the strict liability in
warranty doctrine. See generally Prosser, Law of Torts § 97 (4th ed. 1971).
It has been argued that strict tort liability and strict liability in warranty are identical. In 2
L. Frumer & M. Friedman, Products Liability § 16[4a] (1970) it is stated that:
If a court does not require, inter alia, privity of contract, a sale, or notice of
a breach of warranty, does it matter that the defendant is being held strictly
liable in warranty rather than in tort? The answer seems obvious. If a court
imposes strict warranty liability irrespective of contract and sales rules, then
strict liability in warranty and tort are synonymous.
Prosser feels that for purity of theory strict warranty liability should be discarded and that
liability should be imposed in tort:
Warranty. . . had been from the outset only a rather transparent device to
accomplish the desired result of strict liability. No one disputed that
"warranty" was a matter of strict liability. No one denied that where there
was no privity, liability to the consumer could not sound in contract and must
be a matter of tort. Why not, then, talk of the strict liability in tort ... and
discard the word "warranty" with all its contract implications? Prosser, The
Fall of the Ctadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 Minn. L. Rev. 791,
802 (1966).
12. Cases and authorities cited notes 2 and 6 supra. For further historical development of
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In products liability law the trend has been to gradually shift the
risk from the consumer to the seller, then to the middleman, and
ultimately to the manufacturer. Whether or not the next step is
taken is a choice of allocation of risk of loss due to personal in-
jury. 3
New Mexico case law on product's liability is limited, but a
definite historical development, similar to the one outlined above,
can be traced.
In Wood v. Sloan," 4 a negligence action, the Court had before it a
question involving the liability of independent contractors to third
persons after completion of the contracted work, and its acceptance
by the owner. The Court stated the general rule that the independent
contractor continued to be liable to third persons for injuries re-
ceived as a result of defective construction or installation only in
situations falling into two general classes of exceptions:
(1) Those where the thing dealt with is imminently dangerous in
kind; and
(2) those where the thing dealt with is not imminently dangerous in
kind, but is rendered dangerous by defect.' 5
Thus the Wood decision supported the inherently and imminently
dangerous product exceptions to the doctrine which required privity
as a prerequisite of recovery for a manufacturer's or contractor's
negligence.1 6
No case in New Mexico has dealt directly with the elimination of
the privity requirement with respect to food and beverages sold for
human consumption, but it is clear from the cases that lack of privity
in food or beverage cases does not provide the manufacturer with a
defense.' '
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has been used by a New Mexican
consumer to hold a Coca-Cola bottler liable for personal injuries.'
The consumer became ill after drinking part of the contents of a
the adoption in American jurisdictions of strict tort liability see Prosser, The Fall of the
Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 Minn. L. Rev. 791 (1966); 1 R. Hursh,
American Law of Products Liability § SA (Supp. 1971); 1 CCH Prod. Liab. § § 4050 and
4500 et. seq. (1968).
13. The court in Stang recognized that the choice of whether or not to impose strict tort
liability was in part a choice of how to allocate the risk of loss. Stang v. Hertz Corp., 83
N.M.-, 490 P.2d 475, 478-79 (N.M. Ct. App. 1971), cert. granted Oct. 20, 1971.
14. 20 N.M. 127, 148 P. 507 (1915).
15. Id. at 133, 148 P. at 508.
16. Compare Wood v. Sloan, 20 N.M. 127, 148 P. 507 (1915) with cases cited supra
notes 8 and 9.
17. Cf Wood v. Sloan, 20 N.M. 127, 148 P. 507 (1915); Tafoya v. Las Cruces Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 59 N.M. 43, 278 P.2d 575 (1955).
18. See Tafoya v. Las Cruces Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 59 N.M. 43, 278 P.2d 575 (1955).
(Vol. 2
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bottle containing some unidentified foreign matter. The bottler ap-
pealed from a judgment and verdict. The Supreme Court affirmed,
holding the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applicable. The doctrine
raised a presumption of negligence on the part of the bottler where it
was shown that there was no reasonable probability that the bottle
or its contents had been tampered with while they were in the
possession of the retailer. It is important to note in this case no proof
of a specific act of negligence was established, but the presumption
of negligence arose under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. In ex-
plaining the policy behind the doctrine of res ipsa the Court stated:
".. It ... is recognized as a rule of necessity, and is based upon
the postulate that under the common experience of mankind an
accident of the particular kind does not happen except through
negligence. It bases its chief claim to justification on the fact that
ordinarily the cause of the injury is accessible to the party charged
and inaccessible to the person injured." '19
Although in theory the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is consistent
with the law of negligence, it often works to impose a type of strict
liability since no specific act of negligence must be shown. In reality
all that need be shown is that the product was defective when in the
hands of the consumer and that it was probably defective when it
left the hands of the manufacturer. 2 o "In practice, the opportunity
to hold for the plaintiff has often been all that the jury needed, and
juries must have sometimes found manufacturers negligent in creat-
ing or failing to discover a defective condition when the facts were
actually otherwise. ' 21 For policy reasons, courts have applied the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to hold a manufacturer liable to an
ultimate purchaser even where no negligence can be shown.
In 1968, the New Mexico Supreme Court took another step in the
development of products liability law. The Court totally discarded
the privity requirement in a tort action against a manufacturer or
supplier. It held a corporate homebuilder liable to a remote pur-
chaser for losses due to negligent construction.2 2 They felt the time
had come to fall in line with the established trend in products
liability cases and adopted the reasoning used in Smith v. Atco Com-
pany:2 3
19. Id. at 46-47, 278 P.2d at 577-78 citing Hepp v. Quickel Auto & Supply Co., 37 N.M.
525, 528, 25 P.2d 197, 199 (1933).
20. See Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 Minn. L.
Rev. 791, 842-44 (1966); Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 SW. L.J. 5, 8-9
(1965). Cf Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1943).
21. Wade, supra note 20, at 9.
22. Steinberg v. Coda Roberson Constr. Co., 79 N.M. 123, 440 P.2d 798 (1968). Com-
pare Steinberg with cases and associated text supra note 10.
23. 6 Wis. 2d 371, 94 N.W.2d 697 (1959).
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We deem that the time has come for this court to flatly declare that
in a tort action for negligence against a manufacturer, or supplier,
whether or not privity exists is wholly immaterial. . . .Such an ap-
proach will eliminate any necessity of determining whether a par-
ticular product is "inherently dangerous." 24
Until the Stang decision, it appeared New Mexico would take the
next step in the development of products liability law. This step
would be to adopt strict tort liability by accepting Section 402A of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts. In Moomey v. Massey-Ferguson,
Inc.," a federal court predicted New Mexico's adoption of strict
tort liability. In Moomey, a workman sustained an eye injury while
installing a new steel tooth on a dirt scoop. He instituted suit against
the manufacturer. The tooth had splintered when the plaintiff
tapped it with a 16-ounce ball peen hammer. An expert metallurgist
testified that because of its carbon content, the tooth was susceptible
to splintering, that it exceeded the other teeth in hardness, and that
it exceed the manufacturer's specifications for hardness and carbon
content. Judge Bratton of the Federal District Court submitted the
case to the jury on the theory of strict liability as stated in Section
402A. The jury returned a verdict for the workman, and Massey-
Ferguson appealed to the United States Court of Appeals (10th
Circuit). They urged that Judge Bratton had erroneously assumed
New Mexico courts would adopt and apply the Section 402A rule of
strict liability. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's
decision and embraced Judge Bratton's decision to apply strict tort
liability:
New Mexico has not explicitly adopted § 402A strict liability as
the law of New Mexico. But in Scrib v. Seidenberg, 458 P.2d 825
(N.M. 1969), the New Mexico Court of Appeals did apply Section
402A strict liability as the law of that case even though it
specifically declined to generally embrace the section as the law of
New Mexico. We have recently deferred to Judge Bratton's judgment
of the law of New Mexico in a case involving the application of other
sections of the American Law Institute restatement on tort law
[Citations omitted]. We see no reason for not doing so in this case
where the logic is equally persuasive.26
Judge Bratton and the Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit were
incorrect. The New Mexico Court of Appeals in Stang rejected strict
tort liability as outlined in 402A.
24. Steinberg v. Coda Roberson Constr. Co., 79 N.M. 123, 124, 440 P.2d 798, 799
(1968) citing Smith v. Atco. Co., 6 Wis. 2d 371, 94 N.W.2d 697 (1959).
25. 429 F.2d 1184 (10th Cir. 1970).
26. Moomey v. Massey Ferguson, Inc., 429 F.2d 1184, 1186 (10th Cir. 1970).
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One of the reasons the court advanced for not applying the section
was that it involved "economic considerations, the consequences of
which are unknown, accident statistics which are also unknown and
public demands which [the court is] not structured to ascer-
tain . ..."2 7 It should be pointed out that at each step in the his-
torical movement in products liability law in New Mexico the courts
made their decisions to reject the requirement of privity or to impose
res ipsa loquitur on the basis of logic, justice, and policy as the court
ascertained it, rather than on economic statistics or public surveys.
One writer has analyzed the development:
The law of products liability has been in continual change in an
attempt to allocate the burden of injuries which inevitably result
from socioeconomic interaction in a modern mass-production
society. Courts have employed a progression of legal theories to
effectuate a proper balance among the interests of the injured con-
sumer, the manufacturer, and society, each successive concept being
designed to increase the protection and compensation afforded the
consumer. 28
The reasons advanced for taking the next step and imposing strict
liability in tort seem logical and realistic.2 9 Imposition of strict
liability when a consumer is injured by a defective product will work
to protect the public health and safety. 3 0 A closely related argument
is that imposition of strict tort liability will reduce the number of
injuries resulting from unfit and unsafe products.3 1 Another reason
27. Stang v. Hertz Corp., 83 N.M.-, 490 P.2d 475, 479 (N.M. Ct. App. 1971), cert.
granted Oct. 20, 1971.
28. Note, Products Liability and Section 402A of The Restatement of Torts, 55 Geo.
LJ. 286 (1966).
29. For the opposite view see Keeton, Products Liability-Some Observations About
Allocation of Risk, 64 Mich. L.R. 1329 (1966).
30. See, e.g., Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 896 (1964); Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 67, 377 P.2d 897, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963); Garthwait v. Burgio, 153 Conn. 284, 216 A.2d 189 (1965); Suvada v.
White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965). Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 402A, comment c (1965) states:
... IT] he justification for the [imposition of] strict liability has been said
to be that the seller, by marketing his product for use and consumption, has
undertaken and assumed a special responsibility toward any member of the
consuming public who may be injured by it; that the public has the right to
and does expect, in the case of products which it needs and for which it is
forced to rely upon the seller, that reputable sellers will stand behind their
goods; that public policy demands that the burden of accidental injuries
caused by products intended for consumption be placed upon those who
market them, and be treated as a cost of production against which liability
insurance can be obtained; and that the consumer of such products is entitled
to the maximum of protection at the hands of someone, and the proper
persons to afford it are those who market the products.
31. Cases cited note 30 supra. But see Plant, Strict Liability of Manufacturers for Injuries
Caused by Defects in Products-An Opposing View, 24 Tenn. L. Rev. 938, 945-48 (1957).
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commonly advanced in support of imposing the doctrine is that
those engaged in the manufacturing and distributing process have the
capacity to distribute the loss to the consuming public through
liability insurance and higher prices.3 2 Yet another policy argument
is that the consumer has a right to compensation from the manu-
facturer or distributor when he is injured by a defective product
because mass media advertising and marketing induce reliance on the
part of the buying public.33 The much vaunted product should do
safely what it is advertised to do.
The New Mexico Court of Appeals recognized these policy con-
siderations. But the court felt that since "risk spreading" may de-
pend on the size of the defendant organization, and New Mexico has
little "large-scale enterprise," strict liability in New Mexico might be
an unsound decision. However, since there is so little manufacturing
and production in New Mexico, most consumer products must be
imported from other states. Therefore many of the suits for defective
products will necessarily be against out-of-state manufacturers. Many
companies engaged in mass production have already figured the cost
of insurance into the cost of their products.3" It is possible that the
New Mexican consumer is paying more for products for protection
he may not get. There seems to be little reason to make recovery
against a seller or manufacturer more difficult in New Mexico than in
California when consumers in both states are using the same
products.
In general, retailers may protect themselves from loss by pur-
chasing insurance. Also, in appropriate cases, such as the sale by a
retailer of a defectively manufactured product, the manufacturer
32. See, e.g., Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 896 (1964); Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 67, 377 P.2d 897, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). But see, Plant, supra note 31, at 945-48.
33. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 67, 377 P.2d 897, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963); Garthwait v. Burgio, 153 Conn. 284, 216 A.2d 189 (1965); Suvada v.
White Motor Co., 32 Il. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965); Inglis v. American Motors Corp., 3
Ohio St2d 132, 209 N.E.2d 583 (1965).
34. Jentz, The Increasing Responsibility of the Seller in Products Liability, 4 Am. Bus.
L.J. 1 (1966). At page 22 of his article Jentz states:
This growing trend [in products liability] has led the seller at all levels to
increase its vigilance in producing and selling products free from defects, and
giving the consumer adequate warning of any possible injury to him. In addi-
tion, it has caused business men to procure adequate products liability in-
surance to cover the increasing claims-conscious consumer. The increased
responsibility, leading to strict or absolute liability, has caused an additional
financial liability in the cost of doing business. Whether you agree or disagree
to the extent of this trend of protecting the consumer and nonpurchaser user,
the cost will still usually be passed on to the consumer in the selling price of
the product.
[Vol. 2
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who introduced the product into the stream of commerce may be
impleaded.3 s
The best expression of the value of strict tort liability may be the
first judicial expression of it in the concurring opinion of Justice
Traynor in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. : 6
... [T]hose who suffer injury from defective products are unpre-
pared to meet its consequences.... [T] he risk of injury can be in-
sured by the manufacturer and distributed among the public as a
cost of doing business.... Against such a risk there should be gen-
eral and constant protection and the manufacturer is best situated to
afford such protection. 
3 7
The Stang decision by the New Mexico Court of Appeals was a
retreat from the growing tendency toward consumer protection in
products liability cases. The total rejection of strict tort liability in
New Mexico will probably be short lived. Three alternatives suggest
themselves. First, as more and more products liability cases are
litigated in New Mexico, pressure for change or limitation of Stang
will become great. That change could come by legislative mandate as
the Stang court suggests it should. Second, since the court held only
that it would not adopt Section 402A in this case, it is possible that a
New Mexico appellate court would adopt a narrower version of strict
tort liability.3 8 This version could be accepted when a direct suit is
brought against a manufacturer or producer. But it should be remem-
bered that:
... [A] I of the valid arguments supporting the strict liabil-
ity ... apply with no less force against the dealer. There are enough
cases in which the manufacturer is beyond the jurisdiction, or the
35. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 21-1-1(14) (Repl. 1970). This rule permits a defending party, as a
third-party plaintiff, to cause a summons and complaint to be served upon a person not a
party to the action who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim. For
one example of the use of this procedure in a federal court see Jeub v. B/G Foods, Inc., 2
F.R.D. 238 (C.D. Minn. 1942).
It should usually be possible to obtain jurisdiction over an out-of-state manufacturer
through use of New Mexico's long-arm statute, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 21-3-16 (Supp. 1971).
For a general discussion of how a consumer in a products liability action obtained juris-
diction by the use of a long-arm statute over an out-of-state manufacturer who placed his
product within the "stream of interstate commerce" (the only contact with the state was
the sale of its product within the state by a third-party retailer) see 2 Tex. Tech. L.R. 328
(1971).
36. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1943) (concurring opinion).
37. Id., 150 P.2d at 441.
38. In this case Hertz Corporation was a lessor. Section 402A applies to sellers. But the
court stated that if it applied strict liability against a seller, it saw "no reason for distinguish-
ing a lessor because the practical effect is the same." It also noted that "[t] he strict liability
rule has been extended to lessors." (Citations omitted.) Stang v. Hertz Corp., 83 N.M.-,
490 P.2d 475, 477 (N.M. Ct. App. 1971), cert. granted Oct. 20, 1971.
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injured plaintiff does not even know his identity, to justify requiring
the dealer to assume the responsibility, and argue out with the
manufacturer any questions as to their respective liability. One may
suspect that the courts which relieve the dealer have had in mind the
little corner grocery store. But in these days the dealer is more likely
to be Safeway Stores, or some other nation-wide enterprise which is
the prime mover in marketing the goods, and the manufacturer only
a small concern which feeds it to order.
3 9
Finally, the New Mexico Supreme Court may continue its develop-
ment of products liability law and reverse the court of appeals. This
would certainly be the most desirable development since eventual
adoption of strict tort liability seems inevitable. The federal district
court and court of appeals judges for the tenth circuit projected the
adoption of Section 402A almost two years ago.
MELVIN E. YOST
39. Prosser, supra note 20, at 816.
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